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Abstract 
This paper summarizes some East Asian experiences of export led growth and 
export promotion policies, and discusses possible lessons for today's European 
transition economies. It is argued that the East Asian developments identify a 
potentially important role for public support to infrastructure development and provision 
of various business development services (such as insurance and trade finance, 
information, and marketing skills) to small and medium sized exporters. These policies 
should be neutral across sectors rather than selective. The Asian experiences also point 
to the importance of maintaining competitive exchange rates, which, however, may be 
hard to achieve in those transition economies that aim to fulfill the Maastricht criteria 
regarding price and exchange rate stability.  
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Foreword 
by János Gács 
 
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the 
Economic Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU 
Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was 
particularly encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member 
organizations, while financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national 
member organization, the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research 
(FRN). Preparations for the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of 
communication two workshops, one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm 
in May 2001, helped to elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work 
and discuss results. Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects 
started in September 2001. 
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows. 
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is 
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless 
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs 
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the 
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and 
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU 
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social 
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the 
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided 
under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching 
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development 
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is 
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this 
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and 
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is 
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities. 
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which 
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process 
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different 
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and 
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the 
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied. 
 v
The following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the 
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs; 
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member 
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed 
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of 
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the 
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected 
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible 
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries' development based on the  
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate 
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of 
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human 
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context 
of EU accession. 
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Export-Led Growth in East Asia: Lessons for Europe's 
Transition Economies 
Ari Kokko 
1. Introduction 
 With reasonably low inflation and positive GDP growth rates in most of Europe’s 
transition economies since the late 1990s, the focus in the economic policy debate has 
gradually shifted from stabilization and recovery to questions concerning long term 
growth and convergence. The new key challenge is to establish a policy environment 
that will facilitate catching up: there is a growing consensus that the transition 
economies will not be able to benefit fully from European integration unless the 
development gap to the rest of Europe is reduced. 
 Some general guidelines for what is required in this process are provided by the 
long-term growth experiences of the richer EU countries. These include a central role 
for the private sector, free markets and prices for the efficient allocation of resources, 
appropriate incentives for entrepreneurship, and participation in the international 
economy, but also an important role for the public sector. Sustainable development 
requires a strong state to maintain competition and protect property rights, and to 
provide infrastructure, education, and social services in those cases where the market 
outcomes are not satisfactory. However, the Western economies have evolved relatively 
slowly over a long period of time, and their recent history does not provide many 
explicit insights about the requirements for rapid convergence of the kind attempted by 
the transition economies. The growth experiences of some East Asian economies, on the 
other hand, are likely to offer important lessons about catching up. For instance, Japan 
and the first-generation Tigers, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan were able to raise their per capita incomes from a few hundred dollars in the 
1950s to high OECD standards in the 1990s. More recently, countries like Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and China have been able to sustain high growth rates for extended 
periods of time, managing to significantly narrow the development gap. Although some 
of the magic surrounding these achievements has worn off because of the financial 
crisis that erupted in 1997, it is still relevant to examine the region’s growth experiences 
in light of the challenges facing today’s European transition economies. In fact, against 
the backdrop of the Asian crisis, it is reasonable to expect that any lessons will be more 
balanced and realistic than they would have been only a few years ago, when the Asian 
Miracle appeared hard to understand without reference to abstract concepts such as 
Asian values.  
 Looking at the Asian economies that have recorded the most impressive economic 
performance during the past decades, it is impossible not to notice the connection 
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between strong export orientation and periods of rapid growth and development. In 
most cases, high and sustained economic growth was preceded by shifts from traditional 
import substitution to more export oriented and outward looking policies, resulting in 
export growth rates reaching 20 percent per year (or more) over extended periods of 
time. The focus of this paper will therefore largely be on the policies underlying Asia’s 
export success, although it we will also make some references to the more general 
policy regimes that facilitated the high growth and relatively stable macroeconomic 
development in the region up to 1997.1 The three cases that will be discussed in closest 
detail are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. These are all unquestionable success stories, 
and their starting points after the Second World War, as resource poor, densely 
populated, and largely agricultural economies, are in many respects similar to present 
conditions in many of Europe’s transition economies. The analysis of these countries 
will primarily cover the period to the mid-1980s (in the case of Japan, to the 1970s) 
when the basis for the export success was established. Experiences from the second 
generation of newly industrialized economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) and 
China will be discussed more briefly. For these cases, the discussion will cover 
developments to the mid-1990s: the Asian crisis will not be discussed in detail, except 
when the pre-crisis policies clearly led to imbalances that subsequently contributed to 
the crisis itself. The next four sections summarize the country experiences, while the 
final section attempts to draw some lessons for growth and export promotion in 
Europe’s transition economies.  
2. Japanese recovery and growth: the 1950s to the 1970s 
 Japan emerged from the Second World War with a devastated economic base and 
a foreign occupation force –headed by General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander 
for Allied Powers (SCAP) – that set the course for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of the Japanese economy. Although the Allied policies during the first couple of years 
after the war focused on the extraction of war reparations and the breaking up of the 
large zaibatsu conglomerates that had run Japan’s war industry, there were also more 
constructive and ambitious objectives. For instance, a new Japanese constitution was 
introduced establishing Western style parliamentary democracy, and the broad land 
reforms that were implemented in 1945-46 introduced an important element of 
economic democracy, redistributing wealth from landlords to tenants. This 
notwithstanding, Japanese economic recovery was not high on the agenda before the 
late 1940s: the primary aim of the SCAP, aside from the new democratic constitution, 
was to “punish the guilty” (Flath 2000: 83). However, economic development – 
including the reconstruction of Japanese industry – emerged as a new major objective 
after the communist victory in China (see further Tsuru 1993). Japanese recovery 
became desirable because the US needed a strong ally in the Far East. Allied policies 
changed accordingly. For instance, although the Dodge plan of 1949 was primarily set 
up to achieve macroeconomic stability after the turbulence and high inflation of the 
immediate post-war period, it also set up some of the basic conditions for the 
subsequent recovery and export expansion. In particular, the Ministry of International 
                                                 
1
 For a broader discussion about the possibility to adopt Asian growth policies in the European 
transition economies, see Sachs and Warner (1996). Stiglitz (1996) also summarizes some of the 
lessons from the Asian miracle.  
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Trade and Industry (MITI) was given the power to influence the country’s industrial 
development: the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 was one of 
MITI’s main instruments for selective intervention in development of individual 
industries or even companies. Moreover, the exchange rate was fixed at 360 yen to the 
US dollar, which made Japanese goods relatively cheap in the world market and boosted 
the country’s export potential. These policies, in combination with a well-trained labor 
force – which was essentially the country’s only remaining competitive asset after WW 
II – and US procurements from Japanese industry during the Korean War (1950-53) 
facilitated the recovery of the Japanese economy. Yet, by the time the Allied occupation 
ended in April 1952, GDP per capita was still well below USD 200 in current prices, 
and it was believed that the country’s economy would have to “depend on the Western 
industrialized economies for a long time before stabilizing at any level” (Das 1996:492).  
 This belief turned out to be incorrect. Over the following decades, Japan 
developed one of the world’s most efficient, advanced, and wealthy economies. While 
the annual GDP growth rate of 8.6 percent in the period 1952-1955 may be attributed to 
post-war recovery and the Korean War boom, the 1956-1973 average growth rate of 
nearly 9 percent was clearly generated by a conscious effort to narrow the income and 
development gap to the West. During this period of extraordinary economic 
development, government policies were tailored to promote growth in the private sector, 
industry made a concerted effort to expand investment and absorb modern technology, 
and the population sacrificed current consumption in order to generate high savings that 
could finance the necessary investments. Savings and investment varied between one 
third and two-fifths of GDP. After 1973, growth has slowed sharply, although the 
average growth rate of 3.5 percent per year up to the early 1990s exceeded that of other 
industrialized economies. Since then, economic performance has been significantly 
weaker due to the inability of the Japanese political system to manage the fallout from 
the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubbles in the early 1990s. 
 Export success has been intimately connected with Japan’s overall growth 
performance, and export growth averaged 17 percent per year until 1973. Exports did 
not only provide foreign currency to pay for the imports of raw materials, intermediates, 
and capital goods needed for industrial development, but it also allowed firms to grow 
large enough to benefit from economies of scale that could never have been achieved on 
the domestic market alone. Moreover, exporting exposed the large Japanese firms to 
tough international competition, and forced them to achieve higher efficiency than what 
the more concentrated and oligopolistic markets at home might have achieved in 
isolation. 
Japanese export promotion 
 Although export success has been an important factor in the Japanese economic 
miracle, it is hard to point to many unique export promotion policies that could account 
for the success. The reason, as noted above, is that Japanese industrial policy at large 
has aimed to support the growth and competitiveness of Japanese industry, with the 
ultimate objective of catching up to the West. Firms and entire industries have therefore 
been encouraged to aim for export success even at very early stages of their 
development. In fact, the provision of infant industry protection, subsidized credit, 
beneficial tax treatment, and other measures to support emerging industries has often 
been conditional on satisfactory export performance.  
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 The main features of Japanese industrial policies have been related to competition 
policy and industrial rationalization. One of the immediate objectives of the Allied 
Powers, as noted earlier, was to do away with the institutions responsible for Japan’s 
wartime expansionism. However, this objective was largely forgotten after the 
Communist victory in China, which made a strong Japan more desirable. In fact, 
Japan’s post-war economic revival was largely managed by the same institutions that 
had controlled the country’s economy during the war. At the center was the wartime 
Munitions Ministry, which had reverted to its pre-war title of Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, and in 1949 adopted the name Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). This Ministry was given wide-ranging authority and comprehensive 
responsibilities for industrial planning, financing, enforcing mergers, setting production 
quotas, rationing foreign exchange, and sourcing and allocating foreign technology to 
individual firms. The approach in the long-term planning of the economy was in some 
ways similar to that in socialist economies, with one important distinction: in Japan, 
competition was fierce even when MITI limited the number of players in specific 
sectors to avoid “excessive competition”. Moreover, the government was not directly 
involved in manufacturing, which was the exclusive domain of private firms that were 
strongly motivated to increase their profits and prestige. 
 The main policy instruments until the 1960s were provided by the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, introduced by the Allied Powers in 1949, 
and MITI-controlled investment funds, both in the government budget and in 
specialized credit institutions (such as the postal savings bank). These instruments gave 
MITI complete control over private industry through the allocation of credits and 
foreign exchange for imports. After the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty in 
1952, the system was put to work to generate the highest possible growth rates, focusing 
on 44 “strategic” industries (including steel, shipbuilding, coal, and chemicals) which 
were expected to stimulate demand and production in other sectors. MITI provided the 
investment capital, foreign exchange, and technology needed to upgrade production. 
Nearly a third of the credit allocated to industry during the period 1952-1955 was 
subsidized, at several percentage points below market interest rates. Some machinery 
industries also benefited from significant tax reductions, corresponding to 6 percent of 
total corporate tax payments for the 1950-1955 period. Moreover, quantitative 
restrictions on imports and inward FDI were prevalent. The impact of these measures 
was positive, although the performance of promoted industries was not radically 
different from manufacturing in general. The strategic industries grew by a factor of 3.0 
between 1950 and 1955, while all manufacturing grew by a factor of 2.9.  
 Until 1955, industry was essentially operating under MITI orders, during the 
period 1955-1960 control was managed through credit allocations, and from 1961 
onwards, firms were allowed to prepare their own investment programs with “guidance” 
from MITI officials. Hence, the degree of official interventions was falling over time. 
The value of reduced interest rates and taxes between 1961 and 1973 was estimated at 
only 2 percent of investment for all manufacturing, 1.9 percent for steel, 4.9 percent for 
machinery, and 6 percent for power generation.2  
                                                 
2
 The heaviest subsidies went to shipbuilding and, in particular, shipping, where they amounted 
to nearly a third of investment. However, it should be noted that less than a fifth of subsidized 
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 Moreover, the quantitative import restrictions and exchange allocations were 
abolished and replaced by tariffs during the 1960s. Yet, the level of protection remained 
significant. By 1963, the average tariff for manufacturing was 32 percent, with higher 
rates of 37 percent for machinery industries and 62 percent for transportation 
equipment. It was also clear that MITI’s “administrative guidance” continued to be law 
(see Buckley 1998). An example of MITI’s power was given in 1965, when Sumitomo 
Metal Industries objected to a suggestion for an across-the-board reduction in crude-
steel output. Sumitomo was quickly brought in line when MITI threatened to reduce its 
allocated quota of cooking coal. 
 The government also removed the parts of the Occupation structure that interfered 
with its plans for the economy. For instance, new laws were passed to allow MITI to 
create cartels as exceptions to the strict Anti-Monopoly Law that was modeled on US 
legislation. Major manufacturers and trading firms were under strong pressure to join a 
few leading business groups that had begun to develop soon after the war. Gradually, 
six large conglomerates emerged: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Dai-ichi Kangyo, 
Sanwa, and Fuji. The first three were largely re-creations of the pre-war zaibatsu, 
whereas the others were established under the leadership of the leading “city banks”. 
Each of these keiretsu groups is built around a major commercial bank and a trading 
company, with arms covering all major industries and service activities, and they 
altogether account for between a quarter and a third of Japanese business activity (Doi 
1989). The production networks of the keiretsu are held together through cross-holdings 
of stocks, president’s clubs, interlocking directorships, and other institutionalized 
contacts, and the resources and activities of the different member companies are 
integrated and coordinated. Large and small firms within each group share capital, 
technical know-how, office buildings, and even staff. This structure makes it possible 
for the company group to conceive, design, manufacture, distribute, and sell new 
products using only its own or allied resources, which gives the keiretsu the strength to 
enter into the most demanding fields of business. The general trading companies have 
had a particularly important role in facilitating the Japanese export success.  
 The keiretsu structure also constitutes a major barrier of entry for new firms, 
foreign as well as domestic, who may be unable to tap into existing supply and 
distribution networks. However, although the number of contestants in the market has 
generally been low (and regulated by the authorities) there has usually been strong 
rivalry among several firms in every sector. This has guaranteed productive efficiency, 
and the system of “competitive oligopoly” was arguably a major factor in keeping the 
leading Japanese businesses internationally competitive. 
 In addition to competition policy and industry structure, MITI has also taken 
responsibility for technology imports. Although the initiative for the import of 
technology lay with the private sector, MITI intervened in three ways. First, by 
discouraging inward foreign direct investment, MITI probably made foreign firms more 
willing to license their technology without any direct management or ownership 
involvement. Second, MITI often designated one domestic firm to deal with a particular 
foreign supplier. This weakened the licenser’s bargaining position, since he could not 
                                                                                                                                               
credit went to industry during this period. Economic infrastructure and agriculture were the 
most favored sectors. 
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take advantage of competition between Japanese firms to raise his price. Third, MITI 
often intervened directly in negotiations in order to reduce royalties or to alter other 
conditions in favor of the Japanese parties. Hence, it is estimated that Japan paid only 
about USD 10 billion between 1950 and 1980 to acquire all the foreign technology it 
needed.  
 Some important institutional innovations were also managed by MITI. In 1950, an 
Export Bank was established. This bank, later renamed the Export-Import Bank, used 
government funds to stimulate exports of capital goods, such as ships. In 1951, the 
Japan Development Bank was created to provide investment funds for industry. The 
resources of these two institutions were largely spent according to MITI preferences, on 
projects judged to be in the national interest. Another important innovation was the 
establishment of the Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO. During the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, Japan’s increasing engagement in international trade was organized 
largely at the mercy of foreign buyers, since all the overseas commercial outposts for 
information gathering had been lost during the war. Not only had the main trading 
companies like Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corporation lost their overseas branches 
and offices, but the zaibatsu dissolution program had also split them up into hundreds of 
small units. Hence, JETRO was set up in 1951 to establish the necessary overseas trade 
network, at the initiative of the private sector but with financing from the government. 
The purpose of the organization was “to conduct surveys on the general features and 
trends of Japan’s major export markets as well as the specific conditions related to a 
particular product in a particular overseas market”, “to disseminate the collected 
information to the domestic firms through JETRO’s newsletters and its journals”, and 
“to create demand for Japanese exports through participation in international trade fairs, 
dispatching trade-fair ships around the world, displaying Japanese export products at 
overseas exhibition centers and distributing trade-promoting publications” (Ozawa and 
Sato 1989: 18).  
 The main beneficiaries of JETRO’s early activities were probably the small and 
medium-sized enterprises in textiles and light manufacturing, since the large keiretsu 
could soon rely on their own general trading companies, the sogoshosha (see Tsurmi 
1980).  However, JETRO has rarely competed with the general trading corporations and 
various industry-specific export trade associations that emerged in Japan during the 
1950s and 1960s, but rather turned more and more to provide services in public-good 
type activities that benefit all of Japanese industry. In fact, the scope of operations of the 
organization and its role as a trade and investment promoter have been expanding and 
diversifying with the globalization of the Japanese economy, so that promotion of 
imports and inward investment has now become important tasks for JETRO. 
 Apart from the formal institutions discussed above, it is also common to point to 
some other unusual Japanese institutions as explanations of the country’s long-term 
success, both in economic development in general, and exports in particular. The 
lifetime employment system, the seniority wage system, and the enterprise unions are 
often credited for the strength and stability of the largest Japanese firms. Because of 
these features, Japan benefits from greater labor commitment, loses fewer days to labor 
conflicts, innovates more easily, and manages a superior level of quality control. In 
addition, the Japanese economy differs from most others because of its high personal 
savings rates, the high status and competence of the bureaucracy, the weak position of 
shareholders versus company management, and other characteristics related to history, 
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tradition, and culture. It is very likely that some of these characteristics have also had a 
positive impact on the tremendous economic success.  
 However, it is uncertain which of these features are relevant for countries trying to 
learn from the Japanese experience. For instance, Johnson (1982) argues that “Taken 
together as a system, [these features] constitute a formidable set of institutions for 
promoting economic growth... but taken separately, as they most commonly are, they do 
not make much sense at all.” To phrase this caveat more generally, it is possible that the 
Japanese experience is too special to be copied easily by any one of today’s emerging 
market economies. Unlike most other countries embarking on an ambitious 
development strategy, Japan had a well established industrial tradition and a well 
educated, highly skilled, and disciplined labor force. It is possible that these were the 
main determinants of Japan’s subsequent success, rather than any specific policy 
measures implemented by the authorities.3 The large size of the Japanese economy (in 
combination with its strong export orientation) may also explain why the protectionist 
and interventionist policies implemented until the 1970s did not have the detrimental 
effects observed in most other countries that have attempted similar strategies. The 
domestic market had enough purchasing power to accommodate several firms operating 
at minimum efficient scale in many import substituting industries: both technical 
efficiency and competition could be retained behind the trade barriers. This 
notwithstanding, there is no doubt that export promotion played an important role for 
expanding Japanese market shares and encouraging efficient production. In particular, it 
is important to note the central role of the institutions set up to reduce information and 
transactions costs for small and medium sized exporters.  
3. From aid recipient to industrial giant: South Korea from the 
1950s to the 1980s 
 After the Second World War, the Korean peninsula was divided into two separate 
parts along the 38-degree line. When South Korea (the Republic of Korea) formally 
became independent in 1948, the new nation was severely handicapped by a lack of 
natural resources. The partition of the peninsula had left the South with the majority of 
the population, the minority of the land, and little industry, while the North controlled 
heavy industry, large mineral deposits, and almost all of the hydropower facilities. In 
addition, the country’s initial development ambitions were badly hurt by the North 
Korean invasion in 1950 and the ensuing war. 
 A comprehensive import-substituting development strategy, largely financed by 
US aid, was initiated soon after the truce in 1953.4 Although the average annual GDP 
growth rate during the rest of the 1950s reached about 5 percent, Korea remained one of 
the poorest countries in the world. The dismal export performance during the import 
substituting phase provides one indication of the country’s weak industrial 
                                                 
3
 In fact, Sakoh (1984) and Trezise (1984) argue that Japan’s performance has less to do with 
government intervention than with market forces. Their argument is essentially that MITI and 
other authorities have been successful when their actions have been in line with developments in 
the market, but not when they have tried to interfere with market forces. 
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competitiveness in the 1950s: the real value of the country’s manufactured exports 
actually fell by about 80 percent between 1953 and 1959 (Suh 1996: 578). The limited 
export success also highlights the role of US aid to finance the necessary imports of 
technology, machinery, intermediates, and raw materials during this period. 
 However, in spite of the relatively slow economic development under import 
substitution, the Korean government instituted two policies that turned out to be of 
utmost importance for subsequent development. Firstly, the population pressure, 
worsened by substantial immigration from the North, necessitated a comprehensive land 
reform. The reform, initiated in 1949, limited the maximum size of household holdings 
to three hectares, and created a very egalitarian distribution of income and wealth 
among the majority of the population. In fact, nearly a quarter of total arable land was 
redistributed in this program. Secondly, education was identified as one of the highest 
development priorities immediately after independence, and significant public resources 
were invested in the sector. 
 The character of development strategy changed radically from the early 1960s. 
One reason was the substantial reduction of US grant aid (from 1963), which forced the 
country to increase its export revenues in order to pay for the necessary imports of fuel 
and capital goods. Another cause was found in the widespread political changes that 
followed the political unrest and a student revolution in 1960. A military coup in 1961 
brought General Park Chung Hee to power, and the actions taken by the military regime 
over the next few years reshaped the political economy of the country in a more or less 
permanent manner. One of the first moves of the Park regime was to nationalize all 
financial institutions, in order to place all decisions regarding the allocation of credit in 
the hands of the government. At the same time, many prominent businessmen were 
imprisoned, accused of having accumulated “illicit” wealth. They were later released 
against promises to serve the nation by investing according to the state’s development 
objectives. The incident left a large share of the business community morally obliged to 
adopt the state’s development objectives (Chang 1993:151-2). Economic decision-
making power was also centralized in a super-ministry, the Economic Planning Board, 
which assumed responsibility for the tasks normally divided between specialized 
planning, industry, and finance ministries. The sum of these and other actions was to 
create an exceptionally strong state that was in a position to command a radical change 
in the country’s development strategy. The major performance requirement from the 
1960s and onwards has been “export success”. 
 Hence, although the Korean economy can be characterized as a private market 
economy, it is important to note that the state has had an important role in generating 
the country’s impressive development since the early 1960s. The most important 
element of government intervention has probably been the establishment of a set of 
rules that impose strong export orientation. Detailed Five-Year Plans – the first one 
covering the period 1962-1966 – have defined the current development objectives, often 
stated in terms of export performance, and various regulations, incentives, and 
interventions have been used to realize the plans. The sectors targeted for exports had 
“priority in acquiring rationed (and often subsidized) credits and foreign exchange, state 
investment funds, preferential tax treatments (e.g. tax holidays, accelerated depreciation 
allowances) and other supportive measures, including import protection and entry 
restriction” (Chang 1993:141). In return for these benefits, industry was expected to 
prove its value for development by fulfilling ambitious productivity and export targets.  
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 Unlike most other countries that have opted for development strategies with 
equally comprehensive state intervention, Korea was highly successful for a long time. 
Table 1 below outlines some of the performance measures during the five Five-Year 
Plan (FYP) periods starting 1962. Apart from high aggregate growth rates, it should be 
noted that investment and savings as a share of GDP grew throughout the period in 
question. In 1966, savings reached 12 percent of GDP while investment amounted to 22 
percent. Savings had grown to 24 percent of GDP by 1976, and further to 31 percent by 
1986.  The investment share of GDP stood at 25 percent in 1976 and 30 percent a 
decade later. It is also remarkable that average export growth was maintained at above 
25 percent per year until the mid-1970s, and at double-digit rates thereafter. In absolute 
amounts, exports increased from USD 54 million in 1962 to USD 3.3 billion in 1973, 
USD 17 billion in 1980, and USD 60 billion in 1988. The export strategies implemented 
during these three decades fall into three distinct phases. During the first and second 
FYPs, there was an intense drive to increase exports of any sorts. The third and fourth 
FYPs (until 1979/80) were marked by a bias in favor of heavy industry. The period after 
1980 has been characterized by increasing emphasis on high-tech exports. 
 In addition to describing some of the specific export promotion measures that 
have facilitated this impressive record, the following paragraphs will also point to some 
reasons why Korea succeeded when most other countries have failed to generate 
sustainable export and income growth with equally significant state intervention.  
 
Table 1. Real growth rates of GNP, Investment, and Exports in the Five Year 
Plan (FYP) periods, 1962-1986 (percent) 
 Years GNP Investment Exports 
1st FYP 1962-66 7.8 23.2 26.2 
2nd FYP 1967-71 9.6 18.5 30.3 
3rd FYP 1972-76 9.6 12.7 27.6 
4th FYP 1977-81 5.9 8.0 12.3 
5th FYP 1982-86 5.7 9.4 11.8 
Source: Suh (1996), Table 24.1. 
 
Korean export promotion 
 In the field of trade policy, tariffs and other trade barriers provided significant 
protection for Korea’s domestic industry until the 1980s, and import substitution played 
an important role in most consumer goods and capital goods industries (Chang 
1993:132-135). Yet, export promotion became an integral part of the development 
strategy already from the 1960s, for several reasons. Industrialization required massive 
imports of foreign technology and raw materials, and growing export revenues were 
needed to cover the rapidly growing import bill, particularly after the sharp reductions 
of US aid in 1963. Another reason was that industrialization required more investment 
resources than what the domestic market could generate. Unlike in Japan, domestic 
savings were not sufficient to finance domestic investment, and inflows of foreign 
capital were needed to cover the savings gap. Consequently, export revenues were 
needed to service the foreign loans. In addition, many of the designated priority sectors 
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were characterized by significant economies of scale, and the state systematically 
instructed industry to build their plants sufficiently large to reach efficient production 
scale. Hence, exports were also necessary to avoid losses from low capacity utilization 
in priority industries (Chang 1993:140).  
 The Korean export promotion policies have included various kinds of subsidies, 
preferential prices, and tax and tariff exemptions, although preferential access to credits 
has probably been the most important individual measure. The major policy reforms in 
this field were instituted in the 1964-67 period. At the beginning of the period, the 
Korean Won was devalued by almost 100 percent against the US dollar, with obvious 
benefits for exporters. A major target of macroeconomic policies during the following 
two decades was to keep the real exchange rate roughly stable, to keep exporting 
profitable and minimize excess demand for imports. This objective was achieved 
through periodic nominal devaluations and strict aggregate demand management that 
never allowed inflation to get out of hand. Imports of capital goods, equipment and 
intermediate inputs were exempted from tariffs. Exporters were given credit at 
preferential interest rates, as well as reduced rates for electricity and transportation 
services. Accelerated depreciation schemes and other tax benefits were also introduced. 
Moreover, the full set of export incentives was made available also for producers 
supplying intermediate inputs to the exporters, providing an additional stimulus to the 
development of the country’s domestic production capability.  
 Few of the individual export incentives differ much from those that can be found 
in other countries, but many observers have noted that the aggregate weight of these 
policies was high enough to provide roughly equal incentives to production for exports 
and domestic sales, in spite of significant tariff and non-tariff barriers. This has been 
proposed as one of the reasons why the efficiency losses have been relatively small, in 
spite of the fact that many import restrictions barriers remained until the 1980s (World 
Bank 1993). Another important reason is that the Korean industrial and trade policy  
regime has provided explicit links between domestic protection and exports. Westphal 
(1978: 373) reports that access to protected domestic markets was dependent on 
satisfactory export performance, so that “newly established import-substituting 
industries have been generally encouraged to begin exporting almost at once”. 
Consequently, many essentially import-substituting firms learned to adjust to 
competition and market discipline in their export markets at the same time as they 
enjoyed protection at home.  
 Whereas most of the specific microeconomic policies to promote Korean exports 
are commonly found in other countries, Korea also followed the less common Japanese 
example by establishing several new institutions to encourage the outward orientation of 
the economy. The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) was established in 
1962 with government support to do market research and to promote exports, in 
particular for small and medium sized enterprises. The Korean Institute for Science and 
Technology supported the importation and adoption of foreign technologies. The Korea 
Traders’ Association institutionalized the contacts between business and government, 
and their Special Fund for Export Promotion, established in 1969, was well financed by 
mandatory contributions of 1 percent on most imports. Korean embassies abroad were 
required to participate actively in trade missions and other forms of trade promotion, 
and the government established detailed export targets for individual commodities, 
markets, and exporters. There were daily printouts of exports by company, and monthly 
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meetings chaired by President Park, attended by business executives and top 
bureaucrats, to avoid administrative obstacles and other bottlenecks. The highest export 
achievements were formally rewarded with the national medal of honor, Presidential 
commendations, and various more material benefits, such as relaxation of tax 
surveillance. One purpose of the export targeting system was to provide the government 
with information on export performance: this was needed to monitor the efficiency of 
export incentives and to adapt policies to the continuously changing international 
environment. Another purpose was to signal the importance of exports in the 
development strategy. The incentives were well advertised and the Korean business 
community had no doubts that export success would be rewarded (Westphal 1978: 376).  
 Furthermore, in the early 1970s, the first export processing zones (EPZs) were 
established in Masan (1970) and Iri (1973). Up to that time, the Korean government had 
chosen not to encourage inward foreign direct investment, and FDI had not exceeded 3 
percent of total investment during the 1960s. However, the new EPZs were especially 
designed to suit foreign firms in selected industries, such as electronics and textiles and 
clothing. By providing automatic access to all export incentives, the EPZs were able to 
attract a notable number of foreign multinational corporations, and by 1978, foreign 
firms had grown to account for three quarters of the Korean electronics exports and 
around 10 percent of textile and clothing exports. However, various restrictions limited 
the possibilities of foreign firms to establish affiliates outside the export processing 
zones, and the aggregate share of foreign-owned enterprises remained small until the 
financial crisis in the late 1990s led to comprehensive liberalization and significant 
inflows of new FDI. 
 A result of the strong export drive initiated in the early 1960s was that Korea 
emerged as a major exporter of labor-intensive products, such as textiles and garments, 
silk, plywood, and fish. However, the structure of exports was changing rapidly. 
Individual industries proved remarkably efficient in graduating from import substitution 
into exporting, so that the Korean export structure was in a steady transition towards 
activities with higher value added. By the 1980s, exports were dominated by new 
products, like color TV sets, computers, and cars. In most other countries where 
significant import restrictions have been in place, this transition has been slow because 
attempts to withdraw support from protected industries have typically met with strong 
resistance from the interest groups that risk losing their privileges. What differentiates 
the Korean experience from many others is that the Korean state was stricter in 
enforcing productive and allocative efficiency and upholding hard budget constraints 
until at least the 1980s. Hence, it was clear to most actors that import protection, 
subsidies, and other rents are temporary supports, that all firms are eventually expected 
to manage in international competition, and that the government is able and willing to 
withdraw support from firms and industries that fail to reach their performance targets. 
Restrictions on entry and expansion limited excessive investment in protected 
industries, and the sanctions for inefficient firms – and industries – were generally 
harsh. Chang (1993) refers to several instances where the Korean government forced 
firms into mergers, sales, or liquidation because of inefficiency or “excessive 
competition”, causing low capacity utilization or low profitability, while Thomas et al 
(1991:131) note that no advance assurances of emergency assistance were generally 
available, and that the bankruptcy rate among exporters was relatively high. 
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 The Korean success in disciplining industry may be partly explained by the tough 
measures undertaken by the military regime during the early 1960s to expose domestic 
industry to international competition, but another reason may be the fact that that the 
trade related interventions were concentrated to a limited number of very large private 
firms, the chaebol. These are large diversified business conglomerates that typically 
operate in several import substituting as well as export oriented areas, generally in tough 
competition with other chaebol. The government’s ability to link a firm’s performance 
in one industry to promises of support (or threats of withdrawal of support) in other 
industries has arguably been important.  
 However, there are several episodes demonstrating that not even Korea has been 
immune to the various problems related to selective intervention. One is related to the 
Heavy and Chemical Industries Drive of the 1970s. Although the Korean trade regime 
provided strong support to exports from the early 1960s, it was roughly neutral with 
respect to the composition of exports until the early 1970s (World Bank 1993: 128). 
This meant that almost all the various export promotion incentives were automatically 
available to all exporters without discrimination. The neutrality contributed to 
efficiency, since potential exporters were automatically directed to areas where Korea 
possessed some inherent comparative advantages. In 1973, there was a shift away from 
neutral export incentives to a strong bias in favor of heavy and chemical industries. One 
of the reasons for the promotion of heavy industry was a fear that US military assistance 
would diminish. This necessitated the growth of strategic defense industries in 
preparation for a possible North Korean attack. Three sectors – steel, petrochemicals, 
and nonferrous metals – were singled out to enhance self-sufficiency in industrial raw 
materials. Concurrently, the shipbuilding, electronics, and machinery industries were 
selected to become the country’s future technology-intensive export base. As earlier, 
these priority industries were supported with preferential access to cheap credits, tax 
credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays, and import protection. The 
government also promoted heavy investments in infrastructure and industrial parks. 
Since most of these industries are characterized by economies of scale, an export 
orientation was necessary from the very beginning. With only 34 million inhabitants, 
the domestic market was too small to allow reasonable capacity utilization rates. 
 Although this endeavor to create a national heavy-industry sector was more 
successful than similar projects in other developing countries – largely because 
international competitiveness was the explicit performance measure from the very 
beginning – it can still be argued that it serves as a caution regarding the dangers 
inherent in attempts to tailor industrial development. The direct export share of the 
promoted industries grew, but only from 25 percent in 1973 to 28 percent a decade later. 
The opportunity costs of the bias in favor of heavy industry were significant, since the 
preferences automatically translated into a bias against other sectors. Soon enough, 
serious supply bottlenecks started emerging in light manufacturing industries, 
generating inflationary pressures and weakening the competitiveness of traditional 
exports, e.g. textiles. Large debts had been incurred to finance the necessary capital-
intensive investments (at the expense of investment in other sectors), but low capacity 
utilization, partly brought about by the second oil shock in the late 1970s, forced many 
of the promoted firms to default on their loans. The slowdown in the growth rates of 
GNP, investment, and exports were partly due to these problems. There were also 
serious repercussions on the financial system and the overhang of bad debt from this 
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period burdened the commercial banks well into the 1990s. Moreover, the distortions 
caused by lobbying and rent-seeking were probably significant, but it was not until the 
late 1990s that political scandals and the financial crisis in Korea revealed some of these 
consequences of the earlier selective interventions. One important conclusion is that 
there is reason to be extremely cautious regarding any government’s possibilities to 
conduct selective intervention without inducing costly rent-seeking and corruption. 
 The fact that Korea was not able to copy Japan’s success in government-led 
development of heavy industry, in spite of an environment where industrial structure, 
institutions, political control, and other characteristics were comparable to those in 
Japan, may illustrate the relation between the success of MITI-style targeting and 
market size. Korea was small relative to Japan, and problems with competition, capacity 
utilization, and efficiency emerged much sooner than in Japan. Thus, a more market-
oriented approach came into force from the early 1980s, including not only cuts in the 
subsidies to strategic industries but also a gradual liberalization of the country’s trade 
regime. The reduction of the bias in favor of heavy industry led to improved economic 
performance from the mid-1980s, with significantly higher GDP growth rates and 
export growth rates than during the late 1970s. 
 Another problem was that the heavy and chemical industries drive contributed to 
the further concentration of economic power in the hands of the chaebol, since the 
government had encouraged only the largest business groups to participate in the 
promoted projects. The clashes between government and the increasingly powerful 
chaebol have been a recurrent theme in the gradually less authoritarian political systems 
that emerged in South Korea after the assassination of president Park in late 1979.  
 Park’s successor as president, Chun Doo Hawn, also seized power in a military 
coup. Following Park’s example, Chun’s government tried to control the business sector 
by threatening to prosecute business leaders on charges of “illicit wealth accumulation” 
unless they cooperated with his new economic policies. The chaebols formally pledged 
their loyalty to the new government, but the state-business relationship during the 
following decades turned out to develop very differently from Park’s cooperative 
developmental state model of the 1960s and 1970s (Moon 1994: 147). One reason was 
that the chaebol very much more influential and powerful than two decades earlier. 
Another reason was that Chun’s economic policies – in particular, the ambition to 
reduce business concentration by forcing the largest corporations to sell off assets – 
were clearly contradictory to the interests of big business. Other rules were established 
to promote small and medium-sized firms. There were two motives for these policies: 
aside from the neo-liberal economic philosophy of the new leadership, it was necessary 
to distance the new government from the problems caused by the previous government-
chaebol coalition (Moon 1994: 146-152). Paradoxically, the result was to strengthen the 
position of big business. The efforts to reduce the concentration of ownership had little 
effect, and the chaebol were instead the first to seize the investment opportunities when 
new sectors were liberalized. The liberalization of the financial sector was particularly 
important, since it allowed the large industrial conglomerates to become more 
independent from state-controlled credits. 
 The next president, Roh Tae Wooh, democratically elected in late 1987, initially 
followed Chun’s anti-chaebol policies which, however, changed a few years later, after 
heavy pressure from industry. A conservative coalition, the Democratic Liberal Party, 
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was established in 1990, and government policies shifted to favor big business. The 
Korean won was depreciated to boost exports and most of the various nominal 
restrictions on chaebol expansion that had been introduced during the preceding 
decades were lifted. The result was a very significant increase in investment, and a 
temporary boom in growth. However, new problems had emerged by the mid-1990s. In 
addition to challenges from rising labor costs, Korea was struggling with the weakness 
of the banking sector, the financial problems of some chaebol that had incurred too 
much debt, and several corruption scandals that surfaced as a result of the increasing 
political transparency and democracy. These were all, to some degree, reflections and 
results of the interventions and industrial policies of the past decades. Moreover, the 
liberalization of the financial market, both domestically and internationally, had 
increased the supply of investment capital and contributed, together with state supported 
efforts to make inroads into some new “strategic” high-tech industries, to the rapidly 
increasing indebtedness of the corporate sector. The risks related to offensive 
development policies with emphasis on selected strategic industries were, once again, 
demonstrated during the turbulence following the Asian crisis. With the 30 largest 
chaebol posting an average debt-equity ratio in excess of 400 percent in early 1997, it 
was hardly surprising that a financial crisis could not be avoided (The Economist, March 
7 1998: 6-7). 
4. Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1980s 
 It can be argued that the conditions for economic development in Taiwan in the 
early 1950s were unusually beneficial, in particular in comparison with the concurrent 
developments in Japan and Korea. The new nation had inherited a relatively advanced 
economic infrastructure from Japanese colonialism; immigration from mainland China 
had created an ample supply of skilled and entrepreneurial labor; land reforms, similar 
to those undertaken in Japan and Korea, had been instituted; and inflows of aid from the 
US, comprising more than 30 percent of domestic investment each year until 1960, 
provided badly needed financial resources for development.  
 Yet, it would be wrong to ascribe the remarkable economic development of 
Taiwan during the past four decades to these historical circumstances. Instead, there is 
reason to emphasize the role of sound government policies in creating an environment 
where the private sector has been able to generate a high and steady rate of economic 
growth. Beginning with an early land reform that created a remarkably equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, the Taiwanese government has proceeded with 
policies that have facilitated the accumulation of human and physical capital, upheld a 
stable macroeconomic environment, and provided considerable support to domestic 
investments, industrial development, and exports. Some quantitative data reflecting the 
country’s successful development are summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Macroeconomic Indicators for Taiwan 1952-1986 
 
Item 
 
1952-1961 
 
1961-1971 
 
1971-1981 
 
1981-1986 
Average GNP growth rate* 7.5 10.2 8.9 7.6 
Average inflation rate 8.8 3.3 11.6 3.5 
Gross domestic investment 
(percent of GNP) 
  
22.4 
 
30.7 
 
22.2 
Gross national savings  
(percent of GNP) 
  
21.9 
 
32.1 
 
33.1 
Export share (percent of GNP) 8.8 18.5 42.4 50.3 
Average export growth rate* 8.5 23.5 13.8 13.1 
Import share (percent of GNP) 14.3 21.1 40.5 38.2 
Average import growth rate* 5.4 17.7 11.9 6.6 
Trade balance  
(percent of GNP) 
 
-5.5 
 
-2.6 
 
1.9 
 
12.1 
 
    
Note: * Calculated from data in constant 1981 prices. 
Source: Kuo (1988), Tables 1 and 3.  
 
 The achievements during the 1960s, when Taiwan turned from traditional import 
substitution to a strongly export oriented development strategy, are particularly notable. 
The shift in strategy boosted exports, stimulated economic growth, contributed to a 
reduction of the inflation rate, and helped balance the country’s external accounts. Like 
in Korea, the 1970s were marked by an attempt to target heavy, investment intensive 
industry, with only limited success. From the early 1980s, the focus shifted to high-tech 
industry, again in parallel with developments in Korea. However, Taiwanese economic 
development during the past decade has surpassed that of Korea, largely because of 
significant differences in the character of growth. While Korea’s high-tech drive was 
centered on heavy capital investments in a limited number of large firms, Taiwan 
achieved its high-tech breakthrough through thousands of small and medium sized firms 
with significantly lower capital investment, lower indebtedness, and a more diversified 
industry structure.  
Taiwanese export promotion policy 
 Taiwanese trade policy was largely characterized by import substitution until the 
late 1950s. With the objective of developing an industrial base for economic self-
sufficiency, the government protected local producers of consumer goods, and invested 
heavily in infrastructure to support domestic industrialization. Policies included the 
usual import controls, tariffs, and multiple exchange rates, and the domestic currency 
was overvalued to facilitate the necessary imports of technology and capital goods. 
Moreover, state-owned enterprises held a dominant position in the manufacturing 
sector, especially in heavy industry. Import substitution was successful in the sense that 
industrial production more than doubled during the 1950s, with particularly rapid 
growth in labor intensive industries like textiles, apparel, wood and leather products, 
and bicycles. However, the limits to growth based on import substitution began to be 
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noticed already in the mid-1950s. As the small domestic market gradually became 
saturated, the GDP growth rate declined from a high of 9 percent in the early part of the 
decade to about 6.5 percent in the mid-1950s. The financial costs of import substitution 
were also significant. In addition to the government budget deficits caused by the heavy 
public investment expenditures, the policies contributed to a growing trade deficit: the 
trade regime encouraged imports of technology, capital goods, and intermediate goods, 
but discouraged exports. These imbalances appeared sustainable during most of the 
1950s, but only because the deficits could be financed by large inflows of US aid.  
 The US announcement that aid flows would be terminated by the mid-1960s, at 
the latest, forced the government to rethink its development policy. Without access to 
US aid, it would be necessary to find other sources of badly needed foreign exchange, 
and so the development strategy shifted to emphasize outward orientation, with export 
promotion emerging as a new policy objective. Consequently, starting already in 1958, 
the Taiwanese government introduced a series of policies to support exports and to 
promote inflows of foreign direct investment. The multiple exchange rates were 
gradually transformed into a devalued unitary rate, which translated into an effective 
devaluation of about 60 percent benefiting exporters. Tariffs and other import controls 
on capital goods and intermediates used by exporters were removed. A broad package 
of fiscal and institutional incentives - including cheap credits for exporters, income tax 
exemptions, and cheap export insurance - was put in place to further promote exports. 
The China External Trade Association, CETRA, was established to provide 
international marketing services, particularly for small and medium sized firms that 
would not have been able to afford such activities on their own. Foreign direct 
investment was also promoted with a powerful incentive scheme. Apart from a duty and 
tax-free trade regime, foreign investors were granted a five-year corporate income tax 
holiday and a subsequent maximum tax rate of 25 percent. During the 1960s, the 
government established several EPZs, bonded factories, and bonded warehouses. The 
investors in these zones enjoyed all the incentives and privileges granted to exporters in 
general, but without the red tape that was otherwise necessary. Concurrently, a gradual 
reduction of the effective protection of the domestic market was commenced. 
 Unlike Korea in the 1960s, Taiwan targeted specific industries already from an 
early stage. The promoted industries during the period up to about 1973 included 
plastics, synthetic fibers, apparel, electronic components, consumer electronics, home 
appliances, and watches and clocks. One important point to note about the choice of 
industries to be promoted is that these were selected on the basis of Taiwan’s 
comparative advantages in cheap labor and the existing technological capabilities, in 
contrasts to the Korean heavy industry drive of the 1970s, which was not firmly based 
on existing comparative advantages.5 Partly for that reason, the policies proved 
extremely successful, and Taiwan’s exports grew at an average annual rate of 28 percent 
between 1963 and 1972, from a mere USD 123 million to nearly USD 3 billion (World 
Bank 1993:132).  
 It is also notable that the export boom was led by private firms, in particular small 
and medium-sized enterprises. In the mid-1980s, the private sector consisted of 57,000 
                                                 
5
 The World Bank (1993:132) reports that the Taiwanese government hired the Stanford 
Research Institute to identify the industries that would be most suitable for export promotion. 
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enterprises. On average, each of these firms employed only 40 people. Yet, the 
manufacturing sector was strongly dominated by large state-owned enterprises at the 
beginning of the export oriented period. The role of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
was not to export directly, but rather to exploit economies of scale in the production of 
inputs - plastics and fibers - for the private export sector. There was little privatization 
of state enterprises, and the demand from the growing export sector allowed the SOEs 
to expand at a reasonable pace throughout the 1960s. State manufacturing output 
doubled between 1964 and 1972. However, private manufacturing output virtually 
exploded during the same period, with production growing 11 times between 1960 and 
1972. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of manufacturing value added between private 
and public enterprises in Taiwan since 1952, and highlights the increasing dominance of 
the private sector. By 1972, about 85 percent of industrial employment and value added 
was accounted for by private firms. The growth of private industry was driven by a 50-
fold increase in manufacturing exports over the 12-year period. While agricultural 
products had accounted for 67 percent of exports in 1960, manufacturing had taken over 
with 83 percent of exports in 1972.  
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Figure 1 Distribution of Taiwanese Manufacturing Production (Value 
Added) by Ownership 1952-1986 (percent) 
Source: Republic of China (1990), Table 5.4. 
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 Another significant characteristic of Taiwan’s export-led development during this 
period was the great importance of foreign direct investment. Altogether, FDI inflows 
amounted to about 6 percent of gross capital formation during the 1960s, with a peak of 
11 percent in 1971. The main contribution of these foreign investments was not so much 
the inflow of capital as the transfer and dissemination of knowledge and of skills, both 
in production technology and areas like marketing and distribution. This resulted in 
remarkably rapid industrial diversification and quality improvements - which are often 
prerequisites for successful export performance - during the early stages of Taiwan’s 
export-led development process. The bulk of FDI was directed to export industries, in 
particular electronic and electrical appliances, and foreign firms accounted for 80 
percent of Taiwan’s exports of these products by the mid-1970s. This share has 
subsequently fallen, as local firms have grown into exporting in the same areas. 
 As a result of the successful promotion of labor intensive exports, the pool of 
surplus labor had been virtually exhausted by the early 1970s. The resulting scarcity of 
unskilled labor put pressure on domestic wages, and the emergence of new low-wage 
producers abroad began to challenge the Taiwanese export success. Serious bottlenecks 
also appeared in the transport, electricity, and communications networks. The first oil 
crisis added to the problems, and real GDP growth collapsed to only 1.2 percent in 
1974. Exports declined by about 7 percent in real terms the same year. At that time, the 
government had already realized that a shift in the development strategy was necessary, 
and that future growth should be directed towards more capital and skill intensive 
industries. Hence, beginning in 1973, the Taiwanese government had embarked on a 
strategy to consolidate industrial development. The new plans focused on the 
development of capital intensive, heavy, and petrochemical industries to increase 
economic independence. In addition, a massive public investment program, amounting 
to some USD 8 billion, was put in place to remove the bottlenecks and revitalize the 
economy. The program included investments in highways, railroads, airports, and 
construction of nuclear power plants. 
 The attempt to establish a heavy industrial base was not a total success. While 
selective support for steel and petrochemicals appeared to be successful, there were 
clear failures in autos and shipbuilding. The costs of selective intervention in favor of 
heavy industry were probably not as large as in Korea during the same period, because 
the discrimination of other sectors was less pronounced. Although most small and 
medium sized enterprises did not qualify for cheap subsidized capital, they had better 
access to informal credit than what was the case for non-promoted firms and industries 
in Korea during the same period. Yet, the impressive growth rates of the 1960s and 
early 1970s fell to below 7 percent in the late 1970s, inflation rose, and Taiwanese 
exporters continued to suffer from the pressure of newly emerging low-wage 
competitors in the region and elsewhere. A new development strategy was therefore 
formulated in the early 1980s. The Taiwanese government decided to focus on high-
technology industries, such as information, biotechnology, machinery and precision 
instruments, and environmental technology industries (World Bank 1993:133). This 
shift required a broad and coordinated effort involving industrial, financial, scientific, 
technological, and human resource policies. Tax laws were revised to encourage 
commercial R&D and upgrading of production technologies. New firms were supported 
with access to venture capital. Universities received additional resources to strengthen 
programs focusing on science, mathematics, engineering, and computer science, and 
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programs to encourage qualified overseas Chinese to return to Taiwan were introduced. 
Concurrently, the speed of economic liberalization was accelerated to promote the 
further globalization of Taiwanese business.  
 In contrast to the heavy industry scheme, the focus on high-tech industry proved 
relatively successful. Growth rates recovered to above 9 percent in the late 1980s, the 
current account exhibited large surpluses throughout the 1980s, and Taiwan has become 
a major foreign investor and creditor. The progress during the 1980s was achieved with 
remarkable investment efficiency. A comparison with Korea is interesting. Although 
Taiwan’s population was less than half the size of Korea’s, and although the ratio of 
investment to GDP was a third lower than Korea’s during the 1980s, exports and per 
capita incomes in 1990 were higher than in Korea. It is likely that these differences 
resulted from the stronger state intervention and larger subsidies to capital in Korea 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Korean industry has until recently been dominated by large 
chaebol operating in capital intensive sectors, often with access to subsidized credit, 
whereas Taiwanese industry is dominated by small and medium sized firms for whom 
capital has always been a scarce asset. The difference between these two strategies was 
forcefully demonstrated when the financial crisis hit the region in 1997-98. Whereas 
Taiwan’s low level of indebtedness – both at the national and corporate levels – allowed 
it to manage the crisis without serious disturbances to the real side of the economy, 
Korea faced more severe troubles. The debt-equity ratio among Korea’s largest firms 
averaged over 400 percent, with much of it of short maturity, and the reduced capital 
inflows following the crisis drove several of the leading chaebol to bankruptcy. The 
Korean economy is still struggling to manage the impact of the crisis.  
5. The Second Wave of Asian Growth: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and China 
 At a general level, it can be argued that the trade and industrial policies of the 
economies making up the second wave of Asian growth – Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and China – have developed in a manner similar to that in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan. After an initial period of import substitution (or, in the case of China, central 
planning) all four countries have gradually turned to more open and export oriented 
policies. The policy shift has led to significant increases in exports and imports, as well 
as higher GDP growth rates. The experiences of these countries are relevant for the 
European transition economies for several reasons. First, it is sometimes argued that the 
initial export success of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly 
due to the unusually favorable world trade environment, with fixed exchange rates, few 
non-tariff barriers, and continuous global trade liberalization. The implication of this 
argument is that other countries are unlikely to succeed with similar export oriented 
strategies, because of a supposed increase in protectionism since the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, the countries discussed in this section have demonstrated the fallacy of this 
argument by entering successfully into the world export markets in the more complex 
international environment of the 1980s and 1990s. It is likely that the prospects for new 
exporters are at least as good now as during the 1980s, given the progress of GATT and 
WTO during the past years. Moreover, in spite of selective restrictions and exclusions, it 
is clear that the market access guarantees included in the Europe Agreements are more 
liberal than those available to the Asian economies during the past decades. 
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 Second, the Asian crisis has highlighted some of the weaknesses in the 
development policies of countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Export 
promotion has not been as comprehensive as in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan – in 
particular, exchange rate policies have been used for macroeconomic stabilization rather 
than export competitiveness – export success and international competitiveness have 
rarely been required in return for protection, and governments have typically been more 
vulnerable to pressure from various interest groups. Nevertheless, it is notable that some 
of the lessons from the East Asian economic miracle seem to hold in Southeast Asia as 
well. Economic performance has been strongest during periods of prudent 
macroeconomic management, realistic exchange rates, and outward oriented trade 
policies. 
 Third, the Chinese experience shows that sustainable export booms can be 
achieved even in transition economies. China’s transition and economic development 
during the past decade has been more predictable than that in East and Central Europe, 
where many of the institutions from the command economy collapsed in connection 
with the political transition. However, there has also been a larger degree of political 
risk in China: while the economy has become increasingly market oriented, China 
remains an authoritarian one-party communist state, with a significant degree of 
political risk for domestic entrepreneurs as well as foreign investors.  
Indonesia 
 In Indonesia, trade policies have swung from protectionism to openness, partly as 
a result of the country’s wealth of natural resources. From independence in 1948 to 
1966, Indonesia followed a traditional import substituting development strategy with 
heavy state intervention. The combination of severe trade restrictions and general 
economic mismanagement had a detrimental impact on economic growth and welfare. 
The trade restrictions contributed to the emergence of powerful interest groups among 
traders and domestic industrialists, and the protected domestic industry was 
characterized by low efficiency and productivity. It is estimated that real per capita 
income declined by 15 percent between 1958 and 1965, inflation reached 1,000 percent 
in 1965, and the external accounts were in severe disorder (World Bank 1993:136). The 
resulting social unrest – culminating in an attempted communist takeover followed by a 
military coup and the massacre of more than half a million suspected communist 
supporters (mainly Chinese) – set the stage for a change in leadership. 
 The new authoritarian government under President Suharto restored 
macroeconomic stability, devalued the currency, and introduced significant reforms to 
support private investment. International capital movements were liberalized, and the 
trade regime was simplified and liberalized, although formal tariffs remained relatively 
high. The macroeconomic policy package, designed by a group of Western-educated 
economists known as the “Berkley mafia”, proved highly successful. As a result of the 
reforms, the economy grew by about 50 percent between 1967 and 1972. Export growth 
also picked up, averaging 25 percent per year during this period. Foreign financial and 
political support, motivated by the country’s resistance to communism, was important to 
support the domestic reform measures, as were inflows of FDI, initially focusing on oil 
an gas but later on diversifying to other areas of manufacturing. 
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 The increase in the price of oil and other primary commodities in the 1970s was a 
further stimulus to Indonesian economic growth. The surge in government revenue from 
oil exports allowed the state to take on a more active economic role, and several 
ambitious development programs were established. Significant progress was made in 
poverty reduction, health, education, and improvement of social conditions during the 
late 1970s (Hill 1996:191ff). Oil money was also used to finance substantial investment 
in infrastructure and heavy industry, and economic growth averaged 7.5 percent 
between 1973 and 1981. 
 However, the oil boom also sowed the seeds of future problems. Government 
investment in resource and capital intensive industry generate growth, but at the cost of 
inefficiency and distortions. As the role of the state and some favored groups of private 
industrialists grew stronger, regulations and restrictions on other private investment 
increased. Moreover, the large exports of oil led to an appreciation of the exchange rate, 
which reduced the competitiveness of non-oil exports and led to calls for protection 
from domestic interest groups. By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the trade regime was 
again favoring import substitution relative to exports. The growth rate fell to 4 percent 
during the period 1981-1985. The decline in oil and primary commodity prices in the 
mid-1980s highlighted the problems by causing a serious deficit in the current account.  
 The response to these imbalances was a new round of reforms, initiated in 1985. 
This time, the emphasis was on trade liberalization and export promotion. The currency 
was devalued, trade restrictions were simplified and lowered, and investment 
restrictions were reduced. The response to the more market oriented signals was again a 
rapid increase in investment and exports. Non-oil exports grew from USD 10.9 billion 
in 1985 to USD 39 billion in 1995. The share of manufactures in non-oil exports 
increased from 10 percent to 60 percent. FDI inflows accelerated. The GDP growth rate 
averaged over 8 percent during the same period.  
 Although Indonesia’s economic performance appeared quite healthy during this 
period, some disturbing imbalances were noted already before the Asian crisis. The 
reliance on state-led industrialization and the special privileges for those in favored 
circles created strong interest groups and a political economy where further 
liberalization and deregulation appeared difficult (Hill 1996:93ff). The market-led 
export growth was also threatened by continuing state intervention and targeting of 
“strategic” industries. The Ministry of Research and Technology promoted the view that 
active state participation in industries like aircraft, steel, shipbuilding, ammunitions, and 
electronics was necessary for Indonesia to take a leap into modern technology. 
Although the financial accounts of SOEs in these sectors were not well published, it was 
clear that they absorbed enormous amounts of investment capital every year, and the 
return on this capital was very low, in spite of large subsidies and protection. In 
addition, the private sector was encouraged to borrow heavily to create competitiveness 
in these strategic industries. Indonesia’s heavy foreign debt, corresponding to 57 percent 
of GDP and 200 percent of annual export revenue in 1997, was largely a consequence of 
these capital intensive projects.  
Malaysia 
 In Malaysia, import substitution was also the dominant strategy from the 1950s 
until about 1970, although trade barriers were significantly lower than in other 
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developing countries. The average effective rate of protection was around 7 percent, 
compared with a range of 25 to 92 percent in other economies at a similar level of 
development (World Bank 1993:134). One reason for the relatively mild protection was 
the colonial tradition of a liberal stance to trade and industry (Athukorala and Menon 
1997:64), but the political structure of the country was also an important determinant. 
The majority ethnic Malays dominated politics but had relatively little economic power, 
whereas the ethnic Chinese controlled most modern sector activities but had little 
political power. The bias against agriculture was also less serious than in many other 
countries, because of the economic and political importance of the mining and 
plantation sector. 
 Although the aggregate economic performance during the 1960s was respectable, 
with average GDP per capita growing by around 3 percent per year (Linnemann 1987: 
363), it failed to reduce the gaps in economic and political power between the different 
ethnic groups. The poverty of the majority Malay population did not fall much. The 
resulting ethnic conflicts that rocked Malaysia in 1969 led to a reappraisal of the 
country’s development strategy, and the New Economic Policy (NEP) established in 
1971 introduced a number of measures to promote growth with equity. The central 
objectives of the NEP were to eradicate poverty through employment generation, and to 
increase the economic power of ethnic Malays. Trade policies were instrumental in 
achieving the first objective, and were designed to promote exports of natural resources 
and labor intensive light manufacturing goods, such as textiles, footwear, and garments. 
The policies included the usual tax allowances and preferential credits, but the most 
significant export promotion measures were the establishment of several export 
processing zones and free trade zones during the 1970s, mainly to attract foreign 
investors. To achieve the second objective, Malay participation in business was 
promoted in two ways. First, there was a drive to expand the state-owned industrial 
sector, through the acquisitions of foreign firms and establishment of new companies, 
where Malays would hold most key positions. Second, ownership and employment 
quotas favoring Malays were introduced. Manufacturing firms with more than 25 
employees were required to get a business license, which was not granted unless NEP 
ownership and employment guidelines were followed. Malays were also granted 
privileged access to subsidized credit, share ownership, and business opportunities in 
the private sector (Athukorala and Menon 1997:65). 
 The impact of the NEP was notable. With an average growth rate of 8 percent, 
GDP doubled between 1971 and 1980. Foreign investment inflows to the export 
processing zones grew rapidly and manufactured exports expanded at a rate of nearly 29 
percent per year between 1971 and 1980 (Linnemann 1987: 369). By 1980, 70 percent 
of manufactured exports originated in the export processing zones. Yet, Malaysia 
remained primarily a raw material exporter: manufactures only accounted for 19 percent 
of total exports. The slow structural changes in industry and export composition were 
seen as a reason to promote state-owned heavy industry. The first step in this direction 
was the establishment of the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia in 1980. The 
government provided the Corporation’s initial capital of USD 57 million and guaranteed 
subsequent credits at subsidized rates, as well as protection from imports and favorable 
government procurement. Over the following years, the Heavy Industries Corporation 
set up several joint ventures with foreign firms, in areas like petrochemicals, iron and 
steel, cement, paper and paper products, machinery, building materials, and transport 
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equipment. By the mid-1980s, Malaysia had 867 corporate public enterprises, more than 
a third of which were in manufacturing (Athukorala and Menon 1997:65). Altogether, 
they accounted for some 20 percent of GDP at the time.  
 However, a large share of the import substituting industry was inefficient. Alavi 
(1996:177) reports that there was “no evaluation and monitoring to ensure that the 
protected industries were performing well in terms of efficiency and international 
competitiveness”, and nothing was done to lead import substituting industries to 
produce for export markets. Even with cheap credits and protection, the SOE sector was 
running at a loss. A “dualistic” industry structure had emerged, with a highly footloose 
(largely foreign-owned) export sector concentrated to the EPZs and an inefficient 
domestic market sector operating in a protected environment (Alavi 1996:177). The 
annual GDP growth rate fell to 4.5 percent for the 1980-1986 period.  
 Hence, by the mid-1980s, it was clear that the economic advances of the previous 
decade had come to an end. The increases in public expenditure caused by the 
promotion of heavy industry had led to growing budget and current account deficits, as 
well as mounting foreign debt. The necessary cuts in public expenditure had a 
contractionary effect on the economy, and both domestic and foreign private investment 
were stagnating. Consequently, the NEP was abandoned in 1986, and subsequent 
policies aimed to promote private investment and exports. State-owned enterprises were 
gradually privatized – the revenues from privatization amounted to nearly USD 10 
billion during the period 1989-1995 – and trade liberalization accelerated significantly. 
As a result of these more market oriented policies, merchandise exports grew from 
about USD 16 billion in 1985 to over USD 70 billion in 1995. The average annual GDP 
growth rate during this period was close to 10 percent. A stronger emphasis on 
education and training in public policy also made it possible to gradually upgrade 
production into sectors with higher value added. This impressive performance was 
tempered mainly by a persistent current account deficit – caused at least partly by too 
offensive investment strategies – that reached nearly 9 percent of GDP in 1995. The 
dependence on foreign savings made Malaysia vulnerable to fluctuations in 
international financial markets, as the financial crisis showed after 1997.  
Thailand 
 Thailand’s trade policies during the period 1955-1970 were a mix of support to 
natural resource based exports and protection of import substituting industries. Tariff 
protection was moderate until the late 1960s, and the most important incentives to 
domestic producers were in the form of tax exemptions and other privileges 
administered by the Board of Investment. Nominal tariffs on consumer goods were in 
the range 25-30 percent and tariffs for machinery and intermediate inputs were 
generally between 15 and 20 percent, which was lower than in most other developing 
countries (World Bank 1993:140). 
 This relatively mild form of import substitution changed from the beginning of the 
1970s, when tariffs on consumer goods were raised to a range of 30-55 percent in an 
attempt to encourage domestic industrialization. Since the tariffs on machinery and 
intermediates remained at a lower level, this translated into a significant increase in the 
effective protection of domestic consumer goods industries. Textiles, pharmaceuticals, 
and automobile assembly received particular attention, and the high trade barriers were 
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often coupled with domestic content requirements. However, it is often pointed out that 
Thai policies were not designed to “pick winners” in specific industries. Instead, the 
Board of Investment preferences were extended over time to a wider and wider range of 
industries, and many of the incentives, including a duty drawback scheme, were also 
made available to exporters from the early 1970s. The approach has been characterized 
as “trawling with a large fishing net” rather than “using a rod and the right bait”. To 
some extent, this was probably a conscious and pragmatic policy, given the limited 
ability and capacity of the Board of Investment to identify potential winners, but it is 
also likely that exclusive preferences have been difficult to implement because of the 
features of the political system, with many influential interest groups. One of the few 
systematic biases could be that the duty drawback schemes favored upstream producers. 
By allowing intermediates and raw materials to come in almost without protection, the 
policies may have hampered the development of a more flexible and deeper industrial 
base. 
 Thai manufacturing production grew at an apparently healthy rate of 
approximately 10 percent per year during the 1970s (Linnemann 1987: 299), but the 
second oil shock revealed some of the weaknesses of import substitution and caused 
serious balance-of-payments difficulties. In 1981, the country’s trade policy was 
therefore reformed to increase the openness and export orientation of the economy. The 
exchange rate was devalued, import restrictions were simplified and reduced, and the 
Board of Investment shifted its objective from promoting import substituting industries 
to promoting labor intensive exports and inflows of foreign direct investment. The 
microeconomic incentives were largely the same as elsewhere in the region: tax 
exemptions, duty drawbacks, export processing zones, infrastructure investments, 
subsidized credit, marketing assistance, and so forth. Initially, many of these measures 
were designed to neutralize the various distortions caused by protectionism, but by the 
early 1990s, a more broadly based import liberalization had started, providing added 
stimulus to export production. 
 The effects of the increasing outward orientation were spectacular. Foreign 
investment inflows increased dramatically. Merchandise exports jumped from USD 7 
billion in 1985 to over USD 56 billion a decade later. In 1995, three-quarters of 
Thailand’s exports were manufactures. Concurrently, the per capita income rose from 
USD 800 in 1985 to over USD 3,000 in 1995. However, by pegging the Baht to the US 
dollar, Thailand allowed its real exchange rate to appreciate, with detrimental effects on 
export competitiveness in labor intensive industries. Insufficient public investment in 
education made the problem more severe, since the shortage of skilled labor precluded 
any attempt to move into higher value added sectors. These problems contributed to 
stagnating exports and a large current account deficit, exceeding 8 percent of GDP in 
1995 and 1996. In combination with a collapsing real estate market and stock market – 
which had experienced a boom when the appreciating real exchange rate reduced the 
expected return to investments in export oriented industry – this led to a financial crisis, 
pressure on the exchange rate, and a floating of the currency starting in mid-1997.  
China 
 China is one of the most successful less developed countries in the last decade or 
two, reporting average GDP growth rates around 10 percent per year from 1980 to the 
late 1990s. Coupled with a low and falling rate of population growth, this has led to a 
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doubling of per capita incomes within the last decade. The Chinese success has been the 
result of a gradual process of market development and outward orientation. The central 
elements of the Chinese economic miracle have been agricultural reforms, an 
increasingly important role for private firms and locally controlled township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), substantial inflows of FDI, and rapidly growing exports.  
 The reform process launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 was gradual and 
experimental. The agricultural sector was targeted first, with a dismantling of the 
collective farms as the major reform. The relative price of agricultural goods was also 
raised by about a quarter, and the combination of increased individual decision making 
power and higher prices sparked a strong output response. Output grew at an average 
rate of 6 percent per year during the period 1979-1989, and farm incomes grew quickly. 
Both consumption and savings in the rural household sector increased. This set the stage 
for an increase in rural industrial production, which took off in 1984, when a legal 
framework allowing TVEs was set up – purely private firms were legalized some years 
later. TVEs are rural industries that are owned, at least in principle, by a local 
government or collectively by members of a village or township. In most cases, the 
local governments provide financing for the enterprise, but do not interfere directly in 
management decisions so long as the managers contribute a negotiated amount to local 
funds. These enterprises compete with other firms, have reasonably hard budget 
constraints, and can go bankrupt if they do not cover their costs. Most are run by a 
manager who benefits if the firm makes profits, and is likely to lose his job if he does 
poorly.  
 The increasing role of TVEs and private enterprises, as well as significant inflows 
of foreign investment, helped spark an export explosion in China from the mid-1980s. 
Exports grew from less than USD 25 billion in 1980 to over USD 152 billion in 1995, 
most of which was accounted for by TVEs and firms with foreign investment. The 
annual export growth rate exceeded 10 percent during the 1980-1990 period, 
accelerating to over 15 percent during the first half of the 1990s. Aside from positive 
effects resulting from market orientation and private enterprise, the export boom was 
also driven by important reforms in trade and investment policy. The establishment of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and open cities in China’s southern coastal provinces 
was a particularly important step in the reform process. These regional reforms were in 
essence large scale experiments with trade and investment liberalization that were 
extending throughout the country after about a decade, when it was clear that they were 
highly successful in generating growth and development. 
 The targeting of specific geographical areas as bases for exports and foreign 
investment began already in 1979, when four SEZs were established in Southern China. 
These were Shenzhan, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province, bordering to Hong 
Kong, and Xiamen in Fujian province opposite Taiwan. Together with 14 cities 
designated as “open cities” in 1984, the zones provided an export oriented environment 
for domestic as well as foreign investors, with tax allowances, lower tariffs, better 
infrastructure, more flexible labor markets, and less demanding bureaucracy. These 
preferences were largely made possible by a decentralization of decision-making power: 
regulations and decisions regarding investment, land use, labor policies, finance, 
taxation, and foreign trade were left to the jurisdiction of local administrations. By 
encouraging a concentration of domestic and foreign investment to the zones and open 
cities, the Chinese authorities were able to achieve economies of scale in the provision 
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of infrastructure. The clustering of investment also generated economies of 
agglomeration, such as opportunities for investors to draw on a common pool of skilled 
labor and specialized services. 
 After a relatively cautious development during the first half of the 1980s, the 
SEZs were particularly successful in attracting investment from the neighboring Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, as well as from overseas Chinese investors in other countries. During 
the 1980s, the inflows of foreign direct investment to the SEZs reached over USD 4 
billion. Spillovers from the zones also generated rapid growth in the surrounding 
provinces: industrial growth in Guangdong and Fujian was more than twice as fast as 
the national average during the 1980s. The positive demonstration effect of the SEZ 
experiment led to a diffusion of reforms to other parts of the country. In the late 1980s, 
foreign investors were allowed to set up wholly-owned affiliates outside the SEZs and a 
general wave of liberalization was adopted across China. Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the 
coastal provinces in January 1992 – when he noted that “the color of the cat matters less 
than its ability to catch mice” – gave further momentum to the reform process. Almost 
all major cities and provincial capitals set up their own industrial zones with various 
incentives. The inflows of FDI to China increased dramatically during the following 
years, amounting to a total of USD 72 billion between 1992 and 1994. By 1992, firms 
with foreign investment already accounted for about a quarter of Chinese exports. 
 China has also attempted targeting specific industries, with mixed success. 
Starting in the early 1980s, the government promoted exports of light industrial 
products, textiles, and machinery and electronics by raising foreign exchange retention 
rights on export earnings. From 1985, firms participating in special “export networks” 
have also been guaranteed privileged access to electrical power and raw materials, as 
well as tax reductions on inputs. It appears that the impact on labor intensive exports has 
been positive, while the impact on heavy industry, i.e. machinery, is unclear. Machinery 
exports increased rapidly in the mid-1980s, but the growth was only temporary. Like in 
the other Asian economies, it has proven difficult to succeed with targeting of industries 
that are not based on existing comparative advantages. 
 Some mandatory export targets have also been applied, particularly on SOEs. 
Some 90 percent of Chinese exports are handled by state-owned foreign trade 
corporations that provide various preferences – particularly related to the supply of raw 
materials and other intermediates – to firms that meet their export targets. These 
preferences may be withdrawn if export targets are not met. It appears that this implicit 
threat of punishment has been an important factor in encouraging SOEs to engage in 
exports.  
 Finally, exchange rate policy has been an important ingredient of Chinese export 
promotion. Repeated devaluations had lowered the real effective exchange rate to about 
a third of its pre-reform level by the mid-1990s. This brought the prices of tradable 
goods in line with world market prices - gradually reducing the anti-export bias of the 
old, inward looking regime - and was also a crucial factor in maintaining the cost-
competitiveness of Chinese goods in foreign markets. The period since the outbreak of 
the Asian crisis has seen a break with these policies, as China has chosen to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate to the USD. This may eventually cause problems for the country’s 
export competitiveness, but has not been any major problem yet, largely because 
domestic prices have fallen during the past few years. 
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 The true test of the sustainability of the Chinese economic miracle is likely to 
come during the next few years, as China joins the WTO. The preparations for WTO 
membership have already contributed to a significant liberalization of trade barriers and 
capital controls. For instance, import tariff rates have been unilaterally reduced several 
times since the early 1990s, and various reforms have increased the degree of current 
account convertibility. This gradual liberalization has helped maintain the inflows of 
FDI at a high level until the present, at the same time as most other countries in the 
region suffered from shrinking capital inflows. Other structural strengths in the Chinese 
economy include high savings rates and access to world capital markets through Hong 
Kong, which allow China the option to raise vast amounts of foreign capital without 
relying on short term borrowing. The high standard of human capital is another 
important asset, with tens of thousands of students sent abroad for advanced studies 
each year. There are, however, also structural weaknesses that will complicate the entry 
into the world trading system. State-owned enterprises continue to operate at low 
efficiency, and reforms are difficult because of the powerful interest groups backing 
state industry. Although direct subsidies to state sector have largely disappeared, policy 
loans to medium and large SOEs continue and are likely to slow growth of the more 
competitive non-state sector. The most serious consequence may be a weakening of the 
banking system, which is burdened by large amounts of problem credits (particularly to 
SOEs), and which may eventually cause problems of the kind seen in the rest of East 
Asia during the late 1990s. 
6. Lessons and conclusions regarding export promotion 
 Summarizing some of the experiences of export promotion policies in Asia, it is 
clear that the export booms underlying the Asian success stories did not generally occur 
spontaneously, as an inevitable result of the interaction between supply and demand in 
free markets. Instead, governments played a central role in the development process. 
Most significantly, periods of successful growth and export expansion were 
characterized by public policies providing a stable economic environment with various 
incentives for private business, and promoting the accumulation of human and physical 
capital. It is no coincidence that several of the economies discussed above exhibit 
remarkably high rates of savings, investment, and human capital accumulation. The 
policies implemented to achieve this growth oriented macroeconomic environment were 
quite orthodox. The GDP share of government spending and the level of taxation were 
relatively low. Strict fiscal and monetary discipline kept budget deficits, domestic and 
foreign debt stocks, and inflation rates sufficiently low to be manageable. Exchange 
rates were managed to avoid overvaluation of the domestic currency. The stability made 
it possible to avoid imposing general import restrictions to correct balance-of-payments 
deficits, and facilitated a gradual reduction of trade restrictions. In fact, trade 
liberalization was often integrated with macroeconomic management, so that major 
phases of liberalization coincided with devaluation, exchange rate unification, fiscal 
reform, and inflows of foreign aid or concessional loans to offset the temporary 
weakening of the current account (World Bank 1993). Both trade liberalization and 
realistic exchange rates were necessary requirements for export success, given that most 
exporting firms were dependent on access to imported intermediary and capital goods, 
and relied on low prices as a major competitive asset. Concurrently, land reforms were 
important in many countries to create a more equal distribution of income and wealth 
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and to allow a larger part of the population to benefit from the new export and growth 
opportunities. In fact, most of these policies were not only beneficial for export 
performance, but rather for economic growth in general. 
 Looking more specifically at the policies and institutional framework in the export 
sector, it appears that the most successful episodes of export promotion share some 
common features. First, the allocation of various preferences and export incentives has 
largely been based on markets and competition: to qualify for continued support, firms 
have had to show good export performance. Strict discipline in the administration of 
supports has by and large preserved hard budget constraints. Firms that could not 
achieve their objectives were often forced to merge with others, or even forced out of 
business. Second, it is the private sector rather than state-owned that has been targeted 
and that has responded to the various interventions. In most countries, foreign investors 
have also played an important role for export success. Third, the governments have 
managed to carry out their policies, including the eventual reduction of state support, in 
an orderly fashion, without much interference from the interest groups involved and 
apparently without much corruption. In most countries, there have also been episodes 
when these characteristics have been weaker. Typically, the result has been instability 
and weaker economic performance – arguably, the Asian crisis is largely the result of 
failures on some or several of these points. 
 Regarding more specific export promotion policies, the following common 
elements can also be distinguished.  
• Governments invested heavily in infrastructure. At the early stages of 
development, efforts focused on transportation networks – roads, railroads, port 
facilities – while investments in electricity and telecommunications were more 
important at later stages of the process. Investment in education was particularly 
important, and countries where human capital accumulation was slow have 
become trapped into low wage and low value added sectors. 
• Exporters were given access to inputs and capital goods at world market prices. In 
most cases, this was achieved through tariff exemptions and duty drawback 
schemes, although nearly all countries also established special export processing 
zones or programs for in-bond manufacturing in order to reduce the amount of red 
tape.  
• Exporters were given preferential access to capital and foreign exchange. In many 
cases, credit was also provided at lower interest rates. These measures were 
particularly important in economies with weak domestic banking systems. 
However, long run subsidization of capital has in some countries made economic 
growth unnecessarily investment intensive, with excessive indebtedness and 
vulnerability as a result. 
• Various kinds of fiscal incentives, ranging from tax holidays to accelerated 
depreciation allowances, were used to encourage investment in new export areas. 
These measures are likely to be most important at the early stages of export 
development programs.  
• Governments played an active role in developing new markets by establishing 
institutions specialized in marketing and research, and by disseminating 
information about foreign markets. Apart from the Japanese case, where the large 
 29
trading firms established extensive international networks already before the 
Second World War, it is clear that access to information about foreign markets 
and technologies was the major weakness of potential export companies at the 
time policies shifted towards increasing export orientation.  
• Governments were concerned about enhancing the reputation of the country’s 
exports, and established regulations and licensing procedures to guarantee high 
quality.  
 Generally, these export promotion schemes were more successful when they were 
neutral, in the sense that all (or at least most) potential export industries qualified for the 
benefits. By avoiding selective interventions that aimed to pick winners, it was possible 
to reduce the amount of rent-seeking that firms and industries were prepared to invest in 
lobbying to be included among the lucky few. Moreover, general export promotion 
programs reduced the demands on policy makers that would follow on ambitions to pick 
winners.  
 Selective export promotion programs faced several different problems. A first 
obvious challenge was to identify the specific sectors that deserved promotion. On this 
point, it should be noted that targeting based on current comparative advantages is a 
more reasonable task than the identification of future comparative advantages. Apart 
from the difficulties inherent in predicting future supply and demand conditions (at 
home as well as abroad) the creation of “new” comparative advantages requires 
comprehensive and costly measures to develop factor supply, both when it comes to 
material inputs and labor skills. Yet, even if these tough requirements are met, failures 
are inevitable, as illustrated by the limited success of the targeting of heavy and 
chemical industries in Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, or the many failed MITI projects 
in Japan. 
 This introduces a second major challenge – to identify the unsuccessful projects at 
an early stage, and to manage to withdraw support as soon as the failures are 
recognized. Any export promotion (or industrial policy) program is more likely to fail if 
the targeted firms and industries are given soft budget constraints and kept alive with 
public support for long periods of time. Evidently, up to the 1980s, both the Japanese 
and the Korean administrations were relatively independent from various industrial 
interest groups, and more efficient than most others in setting strict limits on public 
support. In fact, flexibility in adjusting to new market conditions and ability to abandon 
failing and obsolete support schemes may explain more of the success of Japan and 
Korea than their superior skills in recognizing future growth industries. The severe 
problems faced by both these countries in the late 1990s are clearly related to excessive 
investment in specific sectors (“strategic” industries or real estate) and weaknesses in 
the institutional setup of “checks-and-balances” that might have slowed the flow of 
capital to sectors with weakening competitiveness.  
7. What can Europe’s transition economies learn? 
 While it may appear straightforward to summarize some of the common elements 
of East Asia’s export and growth success, it is more difficult to distinguish the main 
lessons for Europe’s transition economies. The reason is not only that there are 
significant differences between Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia, but also that 
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today’s international environment differs from that a few decades ago. As a result, it is 
hard to determine how the relative competitiveness of the European transition 
economies compare to that of East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, and which of Asia’s 
export promotion policies would be effective today. One the one hand, European labor 
is less abundant and wage costs are higher than they were in the individual East Asian 
economies at the time of their initial export booms. The political regimes in Europe are 
also less authoritarian and probably less well equipped to direct the development of 
trade and industry than the governments in countries like Japan, Korea, Indonesia, or 
China. On the other hand, the average level of education and infrastructure in Europe 
today is higher than it was in East Asia some decades ago, at least when measured in 
quantitative terms such as years of schooling or telephones per thousand inhabitants, 
compensating to some extent for the higher labor costs. The geographic distance to the 
main markets is shorter, and the Europe Agreements and WTO rules in combination 
guarantee a higher minimum level of market access for the transition economies than 
what the Asian miracle economies enjoyed in Japan, the US, or Europe. 
 The Europe Agreements, other international obligations and the commitments 
made in the accession process also restrict the policy choices of the European transition 
economies.6 For instance, adopting the European Union’s acquis communitaire 
introduces strict competition policies, e.g. ruling out direct state intervention to support 
“national champions”. WTO membership excludes the use of direct export subsidies. 
The most serious policy-related restriction in this context may be the ambition to fulfill 
the Maastricht criteria in order to qualify not only for EU membership but also for 
joining the euro-zone.7 The Maastricht criteria mandate low government budget deficits 
and stable nominal exchange rates  – while the former is well in accordance with the 
lessons from Asia, the latter is not necessarily so. The reason to be cautious about the 
virtues of a fixed nominal exchange rate is the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 
1964). It is likely that the increase in the relative productivity of tradables versus non-
tradables in the candidate economies will be higher than that in the developed member 
countries of the EU (as a result of technological convergence). This will raise the wage 
level and the price of non-tradables, resulting in rates of inflation that are probably not 
compatible with the Maastricht criteria. Maintaining a nominal exchange rate in this 
situation will lead to real appreciation and probably weaker export competitiveness, 
while containing the inflation may require contractionary monetary and fiscal policies 
                                                 
6
 A further step beyond the implementation of the Europe Agreements is the accession process. 
This process aims to facilitate the convergence of the transition economies to the legal and 
institutional framework of the EU. The Europe agreements and the accession process jointly set 
the rules for the gradual establishment of free mobility for goods, services, labor, and capital 
between the EU and the potential new members (although migration from the transition 
economies will remain limited for several years after EU accession). They also include 
commitments from the transition economies to approximate their legislation to that of the EU in 
areas that are relevant for the internal market, like competition policy and protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
7
 The existing EU treaties and agreements do not explicitly spell out when new members are 
expected to join the euro-zone, or how the financial convergence process should be managed. 
Although there are differences between the transition economies, most appear to aim for 
relatively strict adherence to the Maastricht criteria as part of their accession strategy. 
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that could inhibit growth. These problems may be particularly relevant for relatively 
resource poor open economies, like the European transition economies (Ito et al. 1999). 
 Against this background, there is obviously reason to be cautious in drawing up 
lessons for the European transition economies. It may therefore be appropriate to 
distinguish between three sets of policy experiences. First, there are some policy lessons 
that are clearly appropriate for the Central and Eastern European economies. Second, it 
is equally clear that there are also experiences that are neither appropriate nor applicable 
in a European context. The third category includes some policies that are highly 
desirable for export promotion, but not compatible with the policy convergence to the 
European Union. 
The lessons 
 Regarding the positive policy lessons, it is useful to begin by emphasizing once 
again the importance of macroeconomic stability. It is uncontroversial to note that strict 
fiscal and monetary policies to maintain reasonably balanced public budgets, together 
with relatively low levels of foreign and domestic debt, are probably necessary to 
maintain a stable macroeconomic environment. It may also be necessary to restrict the 
GDP share of the public sector to reduce the distortionary effects of high tax rates. For 
most European transition economies, this makes up a significant challenge, considering 
the historical legacy of a completely dominant state sector. In particular, it has been 
pointed out that pension reform, replacing pay-as-you-go pension systems with systems 
based on individual pension savings accounts, will be needed to reduce the levels of 
current government spending (Sachs and Warner 1996). Other broad policies needed to 
establish a growth oriented macroeconomic environment, such as appropriate incentives 
for private entrepreneurship, broad land reforms, and public support to education, 
science, and technology, are of course also required. 
 Turning to the more specific export promotion policies, it is clear that an open and 
outward oriented trade regime is of central importance. A free-trade environment is 
useful both because it makes it easier to identify the economy’s comparative advantages 
and because it gives exporters access to imported inputs at competitive prices. An open 
foreign direct investment regime is also important for export promotion – a major share 
of inward FDI in the transition economies is already focused on exports to the EU 
(Stern 1997). Moreover, recent research results indicate that the operations of foreign 
export-oriented affiliates may have a positive impact on the exports of local firms as 
well, through spillovers of technology, marketing, and management skills (Kokko et al. 
2001). Neither of these policy areas is likely to cause any major problems for the 
European transition economies. Both the Europe Agreements and WTO membership set 
minimum standards for trade and investment openness, and several countries have 
already progressed well beyond these minimum standards.  
 Many of the microeconomic export promotion measures tested in Asia are also 
relevant for Central and East Europe. Discussing the export impediments for the Central 
and Eastern European economies, Cooper and Gács (1997) emphasize two main 
problem areas. First, they note that exporters typically lack competitive financing. 
Second, exporters lack information on foreign standards, regulations, and customer 
requirements. One reason for these deficiencies is that governments have paid little 
attention to developing the infrastructure for the export sector. In fact, Gács (1997: 323) 
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concludes that “The East European governments seem to have given far less support for 
their exports than their international commitments allow”. In particular, the institutions 
for export credits, and export insurance and guarantee schemes are weakly developed, 
and not much has been invested to establish permanent trade missions abroad. It is 
possible that the most important lessons from the East Asian experience are found in 
these two areas. While the public investments in export infrastructure and financing 
have been important, it is likely that the measures to augment the human capital base 
were even more critical for the region’s export success. In particular, it is notable that 
several of the East Asian economies have established formal institutions for 
international marketing, market research, and technology diffusion. In countries like 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the efficiency of these institutions has been enhanced 
by comprehensive investments in education at all levels. This has not only made it 
possible to transfer foreign technology and knowledge to selected actors in the country, 
but also to diffuse it throughout the economy.  
 Two lessons regarding the implementation of various microeconomic export 
promotion measures stand out. It is essential to maintain strict discipline in the 
administration of the supports, to preserve the hard budget constraints for exporters. It 
also appears important to focus on broad and relatively general forms of support that are 
automatically available to all exporters that fulfill certain predetermined criteria. This 
reduces the rent-seeking and corruption that tends to follow more selective schemes, 
where the profitability of the individual company or group of companies is closely 
related to whether or not they qualify for public support.  
 The most important negative lesson from the Asian experience is related to 
selective large-scale export promotion.8 The heavy and chemical industries drive in 
South Korea in the 1970s and the efforts to create competitive high-tech export sectors 
in Southeast Asia in the 1990s demonstrate some of the costs that are likely to emerge. 
The risk for increased rent-seeking and corruption has already been mentioned. Another 
general problem is that of “picking winners”. While it may be possible to set up strongly 
selective support programs that favor industries which have already demonstrated their 
competitiveness, it is more difficult to identify those industries that will become 
competitive in the future. Moreover, it is typically very difficult to maintain hard budget 
constraints in these “strategic industries”. The introduction of various subsidies is often 
interpreted as a signal that market prices do not matter – in heavily supported industries, 
it may also be understood that short-term nominal profits do not matter. The moral 
hazard involved is, in fact, likely to contribute to too much risky investment in the 
targeted sectors, resulting in excess supply and downward pressure on prices. In 
addition, it may be difficult to finance large targeted programs without introducing 
various kinds of distortions. The sectors that are not supported will face a heavier tax 
burden if the funds come from the government budget. Crowding out and weakening of 
the financial sector are likely if the funds are raised in the domestic credit market, with 
further complications if the policies are financed through foreign borrowing. It is clear 
that problems of these kinds contributed to the Asian crisis in the late 1990s (although 
weak financial institutions, speculative investments in real estate and other assets, and 
real appreciation of the regional currencies were probably more important). 
                                                 
8
 It is hardly necessary to note that direct export subsidies and other support measures that are 
not compatible with WTO rules could also be added to the list of negative lessons.  
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 The main item in the third category – policies that are desirable for export 
promotion but not compatible with the convergence towards EU standards – is exchange 
rate policy. Throughout East Asia, the exchange rate has been used actively from time 
to time to promote exports, and all major episodes of export orientation have started out 
with significant devaluations. High rates of export growth have been sustained as long 
as the productivity increases in industry have matched the real rate of currency 
appreciation. Problems have followed when the currencies have appreciated faster. The 
main example is again the Asian crisis. Most East Asian currencies appreciated 
significantly against the Japanese yen and other non-dollar currencies during the years 
before the 1997 crisis, either because the currencies were fixed to the appreciating US 
dollar or because large inflows of foreign capital strengthened the currencies. This 
reduced export competitiveness, diverted investment from the export industries to real 
estate and other local-market oriented sectors, and resulted in rising foreign 
indebtedness and current account deficits. Although the European transition economies 
are not likely to experience capital inflows of the magnitude seen in parts of Asia during 
the 1990s, similar worries are still relevant. A number of governments favor nominal 
exchange rate stability – in some cases, this is guaranteed through currency boards – 
and all currencies have appreciated significantly in real terms during the past decade. 
This process is likely to continue in the future due to the unavoidable impact of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. It is hard to see how high and sustainable rates of (export) 
growth could be maintained in such a situation. Some degree of flexibility in exchange 
rate policies would therefore be desirable, in particular with reference to EU member 
countries that are outside the euro-zone like Denmark, Sweden, and the UK, where the 
attitudes to exchange rate stability have been less rigid.  
 There are many other areas where similar arguments against strict convergence to 
the EU standards are easy to make – the reason is simply that the present legal and 
institutional setup of the EU has not been established to maximize the growth rate of 
GDP or exports. For instance, Sachs and Warner (1996) argue that the transition 
economies should opt out of the EU’s Social Charter in the short to medium run, to 
avoid burdening their relatively weak economies with the high social costs that are 
implied by full convergence. These concerns should of course be balanced against the 
potential benefits from full access to the Single European Market. The key question is to 
what extent these two perspectives can be combined. The most likely answer is that new 
members will probably not be allowed to deviate significantly from the EU standards, in 
particular when the common rules concern competition in the Single Market.  
 In summary, it can therefore be argued that the Central and Eastern European 
transition economies will probably not be able to duplicate all of East Asia’s growth and 
export promoting policies. This is likely to mean that their short to medium term export 
performance may not quite match that of the Asian Tiger and Dragon economies some 
decades ago, although the export sector will still play a central role for growth and 
convergence. The relevant lessons from the Asian miracle economies point to the 
importance of sound macroeconomic policies and some of the “softer” forms of export 
promotion. These include public investment in infrastructure and investments in 
institutions to support export financing and insurance, market research, dissemination of 
information about foreign market opportunities, training and education in export-related 
skills, and technology transfer.  
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 The lessons from Asia also throw doubt on some of the ambitions to converge 
rapidly to EU standards. In particular, there is reason to be cautious regarding the 
objective to fix the nominal exchange rate during periods of relatively high growth.  
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